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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE-USE TAXES ON MAIL-ORDER BUSINESS WITH No PHYSICAL
PRESENCE IN THE TAXING STATE. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S.
Ct. 1904 (1992).
The Quill Corporation is a Delaware corporation that sells office
supplies and equipment nationwide.1 Its annual untaxed sales to North
Dakota residents are estimated at slightly less than $1 million.2 In an
effort to halt this loss of tax revenue, North Dakota sought to impose a
use tax' on Quill's sales, all of which were made through mail-order
solicitations.' Quill had no offices or sales representatives in North Da-
kota, and none of its employees lived or worked in North Dakota.
5 If
Quill could be considered to own any property in North Dakota, such
ownership would be "insignificant or nonexistent."'
Quill sells its products through direct-mail forums, such as cata-
logues, flyers, and advertisements in nationally distributed "card
packs." 7 It also advertises in national magazines and trade journals.8
All deliveries of merchandise are made through the mail or by common
carrier from sites outside North Dakota.9
North Dakota imposed a use tax, at the same rate as its sales tax,
on property purchased for "storage, use, or consumption" within the
I. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1907 (1992).
2. 112 S. Ct. at 1907-08.
3. A use tax is a tax imposed by the consumer's state on the use of an item that the con-
sumer purchased through a retail outlet in another state and on which no sales or use tax has been
paid. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.8, at 290 (4th ed.
1991). Use taxes are often levied together with sales taxes in an effort to prevent consumers from
buying out-of-state goods instead of local goods which have been made more expensive through
imposition of local taxes. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 6-16, at 447
(2d ed. 1988).
4. 112 S. Ct. at 1908.
5. Id. at 1907. Quill's offices are in Illinois, California, and Georgia.
6. Id. Quill licensed a computer software program to some of its North Dakota customers
that enabled them to check Quill's inventories and prices and to place orders directly via com-
puter. Id. at 1907 n.l. The Court stated that Quill's interests in the software did not affect its due
process analysis and that the interests did not provide the substantial nexus required by the Com-
merce Clause. Id.
7. North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 204 (N.D. 1991). Quill is the sixth larg-
est seller of office supplies in North Dakota. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1908.
8. 470 N.W.2d at 204.
9. 112 S. Ct. at 1908.
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state.' 0 While the purchaser of the merchandise is responsible for pay-
ing the tax, the statute requires a "retailer maintaining a place of busi-
ness" in North Dakota to collect the tax from the purchaser and remit
the tax to the state." The state code was amended in 1987 to define
"retailer maintaining a place of business" as including persons who
regularly or systematically solicit consumers in the state through the
use of direct mail; through printed, radio, or television advertising; or
through telephone, computer, cable, or other communication system.' 2
The North Dakota Administrative Code defines "regular or systematic
solicitation" as "three or more separate transmittances" of any adver-
tising during a twelve-month period.' 3
Quill refused to collect and remit the use tax required by North
Dakota law.' The state Tax Commissioner sought a declaratory judg-
ment that Quill was a "retailer" and a "retailer maintaining a place of
business" in North Dakota and that Quill must collect and remit taxes
on sales to purchasers in North Dakota.' 5
Quill responded that North Dakota's use tax was unconstitutional
because it violated both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.' 6 The trial court found the
statute unconstitutional as applied to Quill, basing its decision princi-
pally on a 1967 United States Supreme Court case which also con-
cerned use taxes on mail-order sales,' 7 National Bellas Hess, Inc., v.
Department of Revenue.' 8 The trial court concluded there was not a
sufficient nexus between Quill and North Dakota to meet the Due Pro-
cess and Commerce Clause requirements of Bellas Hess.'9 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court.20 The North Dakota
Supreme Court reasoned that changes in the economy, in technology,
and in Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause legal doctrine made
10. N. D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01 (Supp. 1991).
11. 112 S. Ct. at 1908 (citing N. D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-07 (Supp. 1991)).
12. Id. See N. D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-07 (Supp. 1991).
13. N. D. ADMIN. CODE § 81-04.1-01-03.1 (1988).
14. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d at 205.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 386 U.S. 753 (1967). Bellas Hess invalidated a use tax on an out-of-state mail-order
firm, which, like Quill, had no offices or employees in the taxing state and which communicated
with its customers only by mail or common carrier. 386 U.S. at 758. For a more thorough discus-
sion of Bellas Hess see infra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
19. North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d at 205-06.
20. Id. at 219.
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it inappropriate to follow Bellas Hess. 1 Using due process analysis, the
North Dakota Supreme Court found a constitutionally sufficient nexus
between the state and Quill to justify the imposition of a use tax. 2
The United States Supreme Court struck down the tax for violat-
ing the Commerce Clause, not for any due process violation.2 3 The
Court held that physical presence was no longer necessary to meet due
process requirements for imposing a tax;24 therefore, Quill's lack of
physical presence in North Dakota was not an impediment to taxation.
However, a company that only had contact with a state by mail or
common carrier lacked the "substantial nexus" required under the
Commerce Clause for constitutional imposition of a tax." Thus, North
Dakota's use tax, as applied to Quill, was an unconstitutional violation
of the Commerce Clause. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct.
1904 (1992).
The Supreme Court itself has aptly termed its doctrines on state
taxation of interstate commerce a "quagmire. "26 The Court's two con-
cerns consistently surfacing in this tax quagmire have been the Com-
merce Clause mandate that states shall not interfere with interstate
commerce and the restrictions on personal jurisdiction imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Over the last 120 years,
the Court's position on whether a state can tax interstate commerce has
shifted from a total prohibition 27 to allowing state taxation if certain
tests were met.28
The Court's attitude in the late 1800s was that state taxation of
interstate commerce was not constitutionally permissible. 29 The Com-
merce Clause prevented any state interference with the free flow of
21. Id. at 213.
22. Id. at 216-19.
23. 112 S. Ct. at 1911, 1912.
24. Id. at 1911.
25. Id. at 1912, 1914.
26. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
These doctrines affect a variety of taxes beyond use taxes, such as severance taxes, unapportioned
gross receipts taxes, and apportioned state net income tax. See generally PAUL J. HARTMAN, FED-
ERAL LIMITS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION (1981); JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN. STATE TAXATION
(1983).
27. Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872); LeLoup v. Port of Mo-
bile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888). See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 26, at 4.5.
28. Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). See also generally HART-
MAN, supra note 26; HELLERSTEIN, supra note 26.
29. Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872); LeLoup v. Port of Mo-
bile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888). See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 26, at % 4.5.
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interstate trade." State taxation was seen as just the kind of interfer-
ence that the Commerce Clause was designed to stop. 1
Beginning around the late 1880s, the Court began distinguishing
between "direct" and "indirect" taxation" on interstate commerce.3 3 It
held that direct taxation was strictly prohibited, but indirect taxation
did not automatically offend the Commerce Clause.34 Finally, in a 1977
case, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,3 5 the Court abandoned the
direct/indirect distinction and set out a four-part test for determining
the validity of a tax impacting interstate commerce.3 6 A tax would be
sustained if it were on an activity that had a "substantial nexus with
the taxing State, [was] fairly apportioned, [did] not discriminate
30. The Commerce Clause does not explicitly restrain states from enacting laws that affect
interstate commerce if those laws touch an area of interstate commerce about which Congress has
remained silent. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 8.1, at 274-75. In those circumstances, the
Supreme Court may strike down a state law using the dormant or negative Commerce Clause.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 8.1, at 274-75. The Court decides whether, under the
Constitution's "affirmative grant of power" to Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the state
law exceeds the bounds of permissible state regulation of interstate commerce. NOWAK & Ro-
TUNDA, supra note 3, § 8.1, at 274-75. Because the Court's power to review state taxation of
interstate commerce arises from the negative Commerce Clause, the Court's doctrines are always
subject to congressional revision. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-15, at 441.
31. LeLoup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888). In LeLoup, the Supreme Court held
that states could not "lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form." Id. at 648. Accord Sonne-
born Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 514-15 (1923).
32. An indirect tax on interstate commerce either burdened "local" activity, or the burden
on interstate commerce was incidental, even though the activity subjected to the tax might be
essential to interstate commerce. HARTMAN, supra note 26, § 2.13, at 62. See also HELLERSTEIN,
supra note 26, 4.5, at 103.
33. HARTMAN, supra note 26, § 2.13, at 59.
34. See, e.g., Sanford v. Poe, 659 F. 546 (6th Cir. 1895), aff'd sub noma., Adams Express
Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 220 (1897); HELLERSTEIN, supra note 26 4.5, at 103.
The Court next shifted its focus to whether the state tax at issue posed a risk of taxation by more
than one state. See, e.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 256-58 (1938);
HARTMAN, supra note 26, § 2.14, at 65; HELLERSTEIN, supra note 26, 4.6, at 110. However, the
Court soon returned to the distinction between direct and indirect taxation to determine whether a
state tax on interstate commerce could be upheld. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946);
HARTMAN, supra note 26, § 2.15, at 76; HELLERSTEIN, supra note 26, 1 4.7, at 120.
35. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). Complete Auto involved a privilege tax based on gross sales, not a
use tax. Id. at 275. A privilege tax is a tax on carrying on a business or occupation. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1198 (6th ed. 1990). It is important to note that the Court in Complete Auto invali-
dated the privilege tax in part because it had upheld other, similar taxes on interstate commerce
that were not labeled privilege taxes. 430 U.S. at 286-87. Privilege taxes were considered "direct"
and therefore, unconstitutional taxes on interstate commerce. Id. at 278. Other taxes, with differ-
ent labels, were sometimes upheld as acceptable "indirect" taxes on interstate commerce. Id. at
288. This distinction, the majority said in Complete Auto, "stands only as a trap for the unwary
draftsman." Id. at 279.
36. 430 U.S. at 288.
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against interstate commerce, and [was] fairly related to the services
provided by the State.
3 7
Since the creation of use taxes in 1935,38 the development of the
law on use taxes has followed the twists and turns of the Court's hold-
ings on state taxation of interstate commerce in general. Other than in
the very early tax cases, 39 the Court has focused on the nature of the
contacts between the taxpayer and the taxing state to determine if a
constitutionally sufficient nexus existed to support taxation.4 0 Physical
presence, in the form of salespeople or offices, always has been enough
to satisfy due process minimum contacts concerns or a concern under
the Commerce Clause that the tax be fairly related to benefits the tax-
paying company received from the state. The closer questions involved
situations where the contact with the taxing state was more limited,
such as in Quill where business was conducted by mail without the use
of local offices or employees.
In Quill the Court held that due process did not require "physical
presence" by a company in the taxing state.4 1 Therefore, the following
examination of earlier tax cases will focus on the development and ap-
plication of the nexus requirement under the Due Process Clause and
the Commerce Clause.42 Cases involving taxes other than use taxes will
be included since the doctrines developed there are applied in use tax
37. Id. at 279. In Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937), the Court upheld the
constitutionality of use taxes per se so long as the use tax did not discriminate against interstate
commerce. Id. at 582-83.
38. The use tax originated in California and Washington. John F. Due, Nexus for Use
Taxes and National Geographic, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 213 (1977).
39. In Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934), the Supreme Court upheld a use
tax on gasoline in an opinion that discussed the Commerce Clause but not the Due Process
Clause. Donald P. Simet, The Concept of "Nexus" and State Use and Unapportioned Gross Re-
ceipts Taxes, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 112, 114 (1978). In Felt & Terrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306
U.S. 62 (1939), the Court used its Monamotor reasoning to uphold a statute requiring out-of-
state companies to collect a use tax on goods sold in California. Id. at 67-68. The out-of-state Felt
& Terrant Company had an office in California from which two salesmen solicited orders. Id. at
64. Payments for the goods, which were manufactured in another state, were sent directly to the
company's offices in Illinois. Id. at 65. All shipments of goods to California customers originated
outside the state. Id. The Court did not directly address the company's contention that its in-state
activities did not create a sufficient nexus for taxation under the Due Process Clause. Simet,
supra, at 15. The case did establish that an out-of-state company which maintained an office and
sales agents in-state could constitutionally be required to collect a use tax. Id.
40. Simet, supra note 39, at 114.
41. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. at 1911.
42. It is worth noting that some commentators believe there is no nexus requirement under
the Commerce Clause. See Charles Rothfeld, Mail-order Sales and State Jurisdiction to Tax, 53
TAX NOTES 1405 (1991).
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decisions.
Nexus and due process concerns were at the forefront in the 1940
corporate income tax case, Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co."3 Wisconsin
sought to force foreign corporations licensed to do business in the state
to pay a tax on dividends derived from earnings generated from prop-
erty held in Wisconsin or from business transacted in Wisconsin." The
Court found that the tax did not violate due process. 45 Justice Frank-
furter wrote for the Court that the test of constitutionality is "whether
property was taken without due process of law, . . . whether the taxing
power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportuni-
ties and benefits given by the state. The simple but controlling question
is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.' 4
Justice Frankfurter opined that a state may levy a tax if it were in
relation to opportunities, protection, or benefits it has provided "by the
fact of being an orderly, civilized society.' "4
Regarding the nexus requirement, the Court noted that the fact a
tax was contingent on events that occurred outside the state did not
"destroy the nexus between such a tax and transactions" inside the
state for which the tax was paid.' 8 These concepts of nexus and of a
relationship between a tax and the benefits received 49 later resurfaced
as the first and fourth parts of the Complete Auto test, 50 a test dis-
cussed by the Court in Quill."'
The Court again considered use taxes in Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co.5" The issues in that case were whether separate in-state retail
stores constituted a sufficient nexus to permit a use tax on mail-order
sales filled outside the state, and whether the imposition of the tax con-
stituted an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.53 Sears, a
New York corporation, did business in Iowa through local retail
43. 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
44. Id. at 441-42.
45. Id. at 444-45.
46. Id. at 444.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 445.
49. The Court has never mandated an exact match between the value of the benefits re-
ceived and the amount of the tax. See generally Sandra B. McCray, Overturning Bellas Hess: Due
Process Considerations, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 265 (1985).
50. Rothfeld, supra note 42, at 1410.
51. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1912.
52. 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
53. 312 U.S. at 363-64. See Paul J. Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-State
Mail-Order Sales, 39 VAND. L. REV. 993, 998 (1986); Simet, supra note 39, at 115.
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stores .5  But some Iowa customers made purchases by mailing orders to
Sears' mail-order department, which was located out-of-state and
which handled only mail orders.5 5 The mail-order department was sep-
arately administered from the retail stores. 56 These mail orders were
filled by shipments directly to the consumers from out-of-state Sears
outlets.57
The Court rejected Sears' arguments that the use tax was an un-
acceptable burden on interstate commerce and that it violated due pro-
cess because it was unrelated to any local activity.58 The Court found a
sufficient nexus for the tax, stating that the mail order sales were not
unrelated to Sears' overall course of business in the state and that the
tax did not equal an impermissible burden.59 The Court concluded that
Sears could not avoid taxation by departmentalizing its business.60
In General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission,61 the Court up-
held Iowa's imposition of a use tax on an out-of-state company whose
only activity within the state was the presence of traveling salesmen. 62
In dicta, the Court compared this case to the Sears case and wrote that
the presence of Sears' retail stores in-state was "constitutionally irrele-
vant" to Iowa's right to collect a use tax on goods sent into Iowa from
out of state.6 3
The Court again explored nexus/minimum contacts6' to sustain
54. 312 U.S. at 362.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 367 (Roberts, J. dissenting). While Sears' employees in Iowa did not solicit mail
orders, some of them helped process the orders. Hartman, supra note 53, at 998.
57. 312 U.S. at 362 (Roberts, J. dissenting).
58. 312 U.S. at 362, 364. See Hartman, supra note 53, at 998.
59. 312 U.S. at 364. Accord Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
60. 312 U.S. at 364.
61. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
62. General Trading, 322 U.S. at 337-38. The company did not have an office in the state
and never qualified to do business as a foreign corporation there. Id. at 337. But cf. McLeod v.
J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944). McLeod was a sales tax case with facts very similar to.
the General Trading use tax case. However, the Court invalidated an Arkansas law attempting to
collect a sales tax on sales made by Tennessee businesses which used salesmen to solicit orders in
Arkansas. McLeod, 322 U.S. at 330. The Court stated that the differences between a sales tax
and a use tax mandated different outcomes in the two cases. Id. at 330-31. The Court said it was
immaterial that an Arkansas use tax levied on the same goods would survive constitutional scru-
tiny. Id. at 330-32. See also Hartman, supra note 53.
63. Id. at 338.
64. One year after General Trading, the Court decided the first of a series of due process
cases that impacted state taxation of interstate commerce. In International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Court considered whether Washington should have in personam
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation and should be able to make it pay Washington state unem-
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taxing jurisdiction in a 1951 case, Norton Co. v. Department of Reve-
nue,65 which concerned a gross receipts tax levied on all business that a
Massachusetts corporation conducted in Illinois, including mail orders
sent to Chicago and then forwarded to Massachusetts for filling."6 The
Court held that local activities which are important to generating or
keeping an interstate market or sales constituted a sufficient nexus. 67
Under Norton, to escape taxation, a company must show that the local
operations were "dissociated from the local business and interstate in
nature.
'6 8
Sufficient nexus for due process requirements was not found in
Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland,69 where the Court rebuffed an attempt
by Maryland to force a Delaware company to collect a use tax on
goods sold to Maryland residents.70 The company, a furniture store in
Wilmington, regularly made deliveries in Maryland of goods that had
been purchased over-the-counter at its Delaware store.7' The company
made the deliveries mainly in its own trucks; but it also used common
carriers.72 The Court concluded there was not sufficient nexus, or mini-
mum contacts, between the company and Maryland to justify imposi-
tion of a use tax by Maryland.73 The Court created a distinction 74 be-
tween regular and aggressive solicitation of business within a state and
ployment taxes. The corporation had no offices or merchandise in Washington, but it did have
sales employees who resided there. The Court stated, '[it is no longer debatable that Congress, in
the exercise of the commerce power may authorize the states, in specified ways, to regulate inter-
state commerce or impose burdens upon it." Id. at 315. The Court, in frequently quoted language,
also wrote that due process requires only that a foreign corporation "have certain minimum con-
tacts" with the forum state such that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" are
not offended by finding in personam jurisdiction or jurisdiction to tax. Id. at 316. A state may not
acquire in personam jurisdiction against a corporation if the corporation has no "contacts, ties, or
relations" with the state. The Court equated in personam jurisdiction and jurisdiction to tax.
Therefore no greater contacts were needed for one than for the other. See McCray, supra note 49,
at 279.
65. 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
66. Id. at 536.
67. See id. at 538.
68. Id. at 537. This kind of thinking reiterated the departmentalization viewpoint of Sears
which found a mere splitting up of business insufficient to destroy nexus. Sears, 312 U.S. at 364.
69. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
70. Id. at 347.
71. Id. at 341.
72. Id. The furniture company also placed advertising that, while not directed at Maryland
consumers, nevertheless managed to reach Maryland residents. Id. at 341-42. The company did,
however, mail some advertising flyers to Maryland residents. Id. at 342.
73. Id. at 344-45.
74. The analysis that led to this distinction has been criticized. See Simet, supra note 39, at
118. For a comparison with General Trading, see Hartman, supra note 53, at 1002.
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the occasional delivery of merchandise bought outside the taxing state
"with no solicitation other than the incidental effects of general
advertising." 5
The Court, following cases involving in personam jurisdiction over
nonresidents,"a wrote in Miller that due process in tax cases required
"some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the
person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.""
The Court in its next use tax case, Scripto, 'Inc. v. Carson,78 ex-
panded its idea of what constituted a sufficient nexus for taxing juris-
diction. In Scripto, the Court upheld a Florida use tax imposed on a
Georgia corporation that used independent contractors, all of whom
were Florida residents, to sell its products in Florida.79 In addition to
having no regular employees in Florida, Scripto did not have any offices
or stock of merchandise there.80 Here the Court found the minimum
connection needed to justify jurisdiction for taxing purposes.8 ' It wrote
that the distinction between regular employees and independent con-
tractors was "without constitutional significance." 2
The Court again considered due process minimum contacts in the
area of taxation in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Min-
nesota.8 In this case, Minnesota sought to impose a net income tax on
the part of a foreign corporation's net income that was derived from
interstate commerce business activities carried on within the taxing
state.84 The Court held that such income from interstate activities may
be taxed as long as the tax was not discriminatory, was apportioned to
activities within the taxing state, and was supported by a sufficient
nexus. 85 These requirements for valid taxation later reappeared in the
75. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 347.
76. See supra note 64.
77. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 344-45.
78. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
79. Id. at 208.,
80. Id. at 209.
81. Id. at 211.
82. Id. The Court reaffirmed its language in General Trading, 322 U.S. 335 (1941), that
states may not tax "'the privilege of doing interstate business.'" Scripto, 362 U.S. at 212. The
Court nevertheless intimated that interstate commerce could be made to pay a fair share of the
costs of benefits. See General Trading, 322 U.S. at 338.
83. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). This case was consolidated with Williams v. Stockham Valves &
Fittings, Inc., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia, argued October 14-15, 1958. 358
U.S. at 450.
84. Id. at 452.
85. Id.
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Complete Auto test.86
The Court found sufficient nexus between Northwestern and the
taxing state based on Northwestern's "regular and systematic course of
solicitation of orders," and its maintenance of an office and salesman in
the taxing state.87 The company carried on "substantial income-produc-
ing activity in the taxing States."88
The Court also held that the net income taxes did not violate the
Commerce Clause because they did not discriminate against interstate
commerce nor subject it to an undue burden.89 The Court repeated the
idea that interstate commerce may be made to pay "its fair share of
the costs of state government in return for the benefits it derives" from
the taxing state.90
The nexus analysis in the preceding cases was under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. In 1964, the Court decided a case that one commentator
described as the only precedent supporting the existence of a nexus re-
quirement under the Commerce Clause.9' In that case, General Motors
Corp. v. Washington,92 an unapportioned gross receipts tax was upheld
as applied to all General Motors vehicles, accessories, and parts that
GM delivered in Washington to local dealers who then resold the items
to consumers.9 Manufacturing, order processing, and dispatching of
deliveries all were made from locations outside the state. However,
86. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
87. Northwestern, 358 U.S. at 454. In the companion case, Williams, the valve company
maintained a sales office in the taxing state and employed a salesman and a secretary there. Id. at
455.
88. Id. at 465. The Court wrote that it "strain[ed] reality to say ... that each of the
corporations here was not sufficiently involved in local events" to satisfy the minimum contacts
requirement of due process. Id. at 464-65.
89. Id. at 462.
90. Id. at 461-62. See D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988) ("[w]ith
certain restrictions, interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state
taxes .. "); see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1981)
(stating that the Commerce Clause was not intended to relieve businesses engaged in interstate
commerce from their just share of state taxes even though taxes increase the cost of doing busi-
ness.) The Court in Northwestern remarked that a "fair share" tax was not the same thing as a
privilege tax based on the right to carry on business in the state. Northwestern, 358 U.S. at 462.
Privilege taxes on interstate commerce were unconstitutional, and taxes that subjected interstate
commerce to multiple taxation, in which the same income is taxed twice, were also unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 458. The Court concluded there was no possibility of double taxation in the instant
cases. Id. at 462.
91. Rothfeld, supra note 42, at 1416.
92. 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
93. Id. at 438.
94. Id. at 443.
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GM had various employees who were Washington residents.9 5 The
Court found sufficient nexus to justify imposition of a tax. 96 It de-
scribed "the bundle of corporate activity" as "the test here," and con-
cluded that GM's activities were "enmeshed in local connections. 9 7
The Court examined the local incidents to see if the tax could be
"fairly related" to in-state activities.98 Quoting from Norton, the Court
opined that in order to avoid taxation, the corporation must demon-
strate that the business sought to be taxed was "dissociated from the
local business and interstate in nature."99 One commentator,10" who
later filed an amicus brief for the state in Quill Corp. v. North Da-
kota,'0' analyzed the General Motors case as a decision that was a
"conventional" Commerce Clause opinion until the Court began dis-
cussing minimum contacts.102 In discussing the search for "local inci-
dents," ' under Commerce Clause analysis, the Court quoted the
Miller Bros. due process test requiring "some definite link, some mini-
mum connection, between a state and the person, property, or transac-
tion it seeks to tax."104 The commentator contended that the minimum
contacts language in this case merged a Commerce Clause local inci-
dents requirement, which prohibited direct taxation of interstate com-
merce,10 5 with the due process jurisdiction-to-tax standard.10 6 The com-
mentator wrote that this language in General Motors "appears to be.
the origin of the Commerce Clause nexus requirement.' 
0 7
In 1967 the Court declared in National Bellas Hess, Inc., v. De-
95. Id. at 445.
96. Id. at 447-48.
97. Id. at 447 (citing Norton, 340 U.S. at 537).
98. Id. at 441.
99. Id. (quoting Norton, 340 U.S. at 537).
100. Charles Rothfeld, of counsel to Mayer, Brown & Platt, Washington.
101. 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
102. Rothfeld, supra note 42, at 1416.
103. "Local incidents" means the "taxpayer's business activities within the state." General
Motors, 377 U.S. 436, 441.
104. Id. at 447-48 (quoting Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 344-45).
105. In Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), the Court relied on a distinction between
"direct" and "indirect" taxes on interstate commerce to invalidate an Indiana gross receipts tax.
Id. at 250-5 I. The state tried to tax proceeds from a sale in New York of stock held in Indiana.
Id. While the holder of the stock was an Indiana resident who was clearly subject to state taxing
jurisdiction, the Court nevertheless said the tax was a direct one "on the very process of interstate
commerce," and was therefore invalid. Id. at 253-54. Freeman set out "a blanket prohibition
against any state taxation imposed directly on an interstate transaction." Complete Auto, 430
U.S. at 279.
106. Rothfeld, supra note 42, at 1416.
107. Rothfeld, supra note 42, at 1416.
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partment of Revenue, °8 that similar tests were used to determine
whether a state tax violated the Commerce Clause or ran afoul of due
process requirements." 9 The Court apparently determined that the tax
at issue failed both tests. ° The fact situation of National Bellas Hess
was nearly identical to the Quill case. National Bellas Hess was a mail
order business which was incorporated in Delaware and had its main
office in Missouri. 1 ' It maintained neither outlets nor salespeople in
Illinois."' Its only contacts with Illinois were through the United
States mail or common carrier." 3 Under an Illinois statute, Bellas Hess
was classified as a retailer " 'maintaining a place of business' " in the
state and was therefore required to collect a use tax and remit it to the
state." 4
In its due process analysis, the Court concluded that states may
not require out-of-state mail order companies to collect use taxes from
in-state purchases if the companies had no physical presence in the tax-
ing state.'" Permitting state taxation without a physical presence
would violate the Due Process Clause, the Court indicated.11 6 The
Court recited the "minimum connection" requirement for taxation
from Miller Bros." 7 It also repeated the language from Wisconsin v.
J.C. Penney Co.: the "simple but controlling question is whether the
108. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
109. Id. at 756.
110. Id. at 758-59. Some commentators remain uncertain whether Bellas Hess was decided
on Commerce Clause or Due Process grounds. See Timothy H. Gillis, Note, Collecting the Use
Tax on Mail Order Sales, 79 GEo. L.J. 535, 542. The Court in Quill wrote that the Bellas Hess
decision was based on both the Commerce and Due Process clauses. Quill, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1909
(1992).
111. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753-54.
112. Id. at 754.
113. Id. at 758.
114. Id. at 755 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 439.2 (1965)). The company would mail
catalogues and advertising flyers to Illinois customers, who would then mail their orders to the
Missouri office. Id. at 754-55. Merchandise was sent to customers via mail or common carrier. Id.
at 755. The company did not have a telephone listing in Illinois, and it did not advertise its
products in newspapers, on billboards, or on radio in Illinois. Id. at 754.
115. Id. at 758.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 756 (quoting Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 344-45). See supra text accompanying
note 77. While the Court in Bellas Hess was unable to find nexus on the basis of systematic
mailings into a state, it later found sufficient minimum contacts where a company had but a single
employee in a state. In Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington, 419 U.S. 560 (1975), the
Court upheld an unapportioned gross receipts tax and rejected the assertion that the in-state activ-
ities were too "thin and inconsequential" to sustain the tax. Id. at 561. The employee was an
aerospace engineer who did not take any purchase orders for the company, did not have an office,
and who spent most of his time consulting with his employer's major client in the area. Id.
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state has given anything for which it can ask return. 11 8 The Court
observed that it never had held that a State could impose a use tax on a
company "whose only connection with customers in the State is by
common carrier" or through the mail'1 9 and stated that it would not
"obliterate" the distinction for tax purposes between firms that have
"retail outlets, solicitors or property" inside a state, and those firms
that merely interact with customers via mail or common carrier "as
part of a general interstate business. 1 20
With respect to Commerce Clause concerns, the Court quoted a
portion of an earlier decision1 21 which held that state taxation of inter-
state commerce was permissible only if it were designed to make com-
merce "bear a fair share of the cost of the local government whose
protection it enjoys.' 22 The Court expressed a fear that if the Illinois
use tax were upheld, other states and other political subdivisions would
impose use taxes and "the resulting impediments upon the free conduct
of . . . interstate business would be neither imaginary nor remote. '123
Then in 1977 in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 24 the
Court announced a four-part test for determining the validity of a
tax' 2 5 which burdens interstate commerce.2 6 For a tax to be valid,
118. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435, 444
(1940)).
119. 386 U.S. at 758.
120. Id. Justice Fortas, who dissented with two other justices, would have upheld the tax
because he considered the catalogue and other mailings to be a "large scale, systematic, continu-
ous solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market . . ." which created a sufficient
nexus for taxation. Id. at 761 (Fortas, Black, Douglas, JJ. dissenting). In addition, Justice Fortas
contehded that Bellas Hess did enjoy benefits provided by the state "as fully as if it were a retail
store or maintained salesmen therein." Id. at 762.
121. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946). See supra note 105.
122. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756 (quoting Freeman, 329 U.S. at 253).
123. Id. at 759. Interstate business could become entangled in requirements to pay use taxes
to many different local jurisdictions which had "no legitimate claim" to impose an equitable share
of the cost of local government services. Id. at 759-60.
124. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
125. The tax was a privilege tax on engaging in business within the state and was based on
a business's gross sales. Id. at 275.
126. Id. at 279. Complete Auto overruled Spector Motor Service Inc. v. O'Connor, 340
U.S. 602 (1951), which found that the privilege tax at issue was a direct tax on interstate com-
merce and was therefore unconstitutional. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 289. See Spector Motor,
340 U.S. at 608. The Court noted that a tax in the same amount, but structured differently so
that it was not a privilege tax, could be upheld even if the extent of the economic burden on
interstate commerce was the same. Id. The Court wrote that whether a state may "validly make
interstate commerce pay its way depends . . . upon the constitutional channel through which it
attempts to do so." Id. In Complete Auto, the Court said Spector was one of a line of cases that
"reflects an underlying philosophy that interstate commerce should enjoy a sort of 'free trade'
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there must be a substantial nexus 27 between the taxpayer and the tax-
ing state;12 the tax must be fairly apportioned; the tax must not be
discriminatory in nature, and it must bear a fair relation to services
provided by the state. 12 9
The Quill opinion left the Complete Auto test intact. However,
Quill overruled other tax decisions, including Bellas Hess,13n insofar as
they held that due process requires a company to have some physical
presence in a state before the state can impose the duty to collect a use
tax. 13' But the Court salvaged the Commerce Clause portion of Bellas
Hess, which held that a company who only had contacts with the tax-
ing state by common carrier or by mail did not have the "substantial
nexus" required by the Commerce Clause to justify imposition of a
immunity from state taxation." Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 278 (footnote omitted). The Com-
plete Auto Court rejected the formalism of this line of cases, which found that direct taxes on
interstate commerce were per se unconstitutional, Id. at 280. The Court explained that the real
focus of the inquiry should be whether the tax in question produces an effect forbidden by the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 288.
127. Later in 1977, the Court again focused on the nexus requirement in use tax cases when
it decided another case dealing with mail-order businesses, National Geographic Society v. Cali-
fornia Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977). The Court appeared to lump together nexus
under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses. Id. at 554. In this case, the Society maintained
advertising offices in California, but all mail-order sales for California were handled by the Soci-
ety's Washington D.C. headquarters. Id. at 552. The Court upheld California's imposition of a use
tax on the mail-order sales. Id. at 556. It reasoned that the in-state advertising offices provided the
nexus required under both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses. Id. The Court rejected the
Society's argument that nexus should exist only when there both is a relationship between the
taxing state and the seller and "between the activity of the seller sought to be taxed and the
seller's activity within the State." Id. at 560. The Court said the Society's continuous presence in
the state meant that the Society enjoyed state-provided benefits such as police and fire protection
for which the state could expect something in return. Id. at 561-62. The Court also said there
were sufficient minimum contacts to impose a tax without offending due process. See id. at 555-
56.
128. The taxpayer did not contend that there were insufficient minimum contacts to sustain
the tax. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 277-78, 287. The taxpayer was an out-of-state corporation
which had trucks and employees in the taxing state. Id. at 276.
129. Id. at 279. See Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 111 S. Ct. 818, 828
(1991) (involving a business tax, in which the Court said the Complete Auto test is responsive to
both Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause concerns); D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486
U.S. 24 (1988) (applying the Complete Auto test to uphold a use tax on catalogues, concluding
that the tax did not violate the Commerce Clause); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453
U.S. 609 (1981) (utilizing Complete Auto test to uphold severance tax on coal mined in Montana
but sold outside the state).
130. The Court in Quill stated that the Bellas Hess holding relied on both the Due Process
and Commerce Clauses. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 . Ct. 1904, 1909 (1992).
131. Id. at 1911. See generally Simet, supra note 39; McCray, supra note 49. See Rothfeld,
supra note 42, at 1408-15; Hartman, supra note 53, at 1009-11.
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tax.132 The Court used this reasoning to invalidate the use tax at issue
in Quill.'33
In its discussion of due process, the unanimous portion of the
Court's opinion noted the evolution of its due process jurisprudence in
the twenty-five years since the Bellas Hess decision."" The Court cited
its previous holdings on in personam jurisdiction: if an out-of-state cor-
poration "purposely avails itself of the benefits of an economic market"
in a state, the corporation may be subject to the state's in personam
jurisdiction even if it had no physical presence in the state.1 35 Quoting
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,3 6 the Court stated that so long as a
corporation's efforts were " 'purposefully directed' toward residents of
another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence
of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there." '137 The
Court concluded that, under this evolution of due process reasoning,
due process was not offended by imposing a use tax collection duty on a
mail-order business that engaged in "continuous and widespread solici-
tation" inside a state. 38
In another unanimous portion of the opinion, the Court concluded
that even if a tax met the minimum contacts necessary to uphold it
under the Due Process Clause, the tax could still be invalid under the
Commerce Clause. 1 9 If there were sufficient minimum contacts be-
tween the state seeking to impose the tax and the business it sought to
tax, the tax may be upheld against due process objections.140 However,
if this same tax placed an impermissible burden on interstate com-
merce, it would not survive a Commerce Clause challenge. 4
The Court further observed that while Congress had "plenary
power to regulate commerce among the States and thus may authorize
state actions that burden interstate commerce," Congress does not have
the power to sanction violations of the Due Process Clause.1 42 Thus, by
removing the Due Process Clause impediment, the Court cleared the
132. 112 S. Ct. at 1912-13.
133. Id. at 1914, 1916.
134. Id. at 1910. See supra note 64.
135. 112 S. Ct. at 1910.
136. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
137. 112 S. Ct. at 1910-11 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476).
138. Id. at 1911.
139. Id. at 1909.
140. Id.
141. Id. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 8.1.
142. 112 S. Ct. at 1909. This observation was made in an unanimous part of the opinion.
See id.
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way for Congress to permit states to "burden" interstate mail-order
businesses with use taxes.143
Part IV of the Quill opinion, which was joined in by only five jus-
tices, " concerned the "negative" or "dormant" Commerce Clause. 4 '
The justices opined that the nexus requirements of the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses were not the same.'4" Due process focused on fun-
damental fairness and "notice" to the individual or corporation. 4 By
contrast, the Commerce Clause "and its nexus requirement" were con-
cerned with how state regulation affected interstate commerce through-
out the nation as a whole. 4"
The five justices, responding to the North Dakota Supreme
Court's contention that Complete Auto undercut the Commerce Clause
portion of the Bellas Hess decision,' 49 explained that the Complete
Auto test embodied the same Commerce Clause concerns evinced by
Bellas Hess 5 ' and also encompassed due process concerns.1 '
The justices wrote that the second and third parts of the Complete
Auto test," 2 which concerned fair apportionment and non-discrimina-
tion, were aimed at prohibiting an unfair amount of taxes on interstate
commerce.' 53 The first and fourth parts of the test required a substan-
tial nexus and some relationship between the tax and services provided
by the state." The test was designed to ensure that states could not
unduly burden interstate commerce. 5 ' The justices wrote that the sub-
stantial nexus requirement, unlike due process' "minimum contacts," is
not "a proxy for notice," but instead is a means of limiting the burdens
143. Id. at 1916. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Stevens, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Sou-
ter made this observation in Part IV of the Quill opinion, in which only they joined.
144. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Stevens, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Souter.
145. 112 S. Ct. at 1911. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 8.5, at 281; PAUL
HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 2.17, at 21 (Supp. 1992) [herein-
after HARTMAN Supp.].
146. 112 S. Ct. at 1913. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 8.11, at 303.
147. 112 S. Ct. at 1913.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1912.
150. Id.
151. See supra note 64.
152. For discussions of Complete Auto, see HARTMAN Supp., supra note 145, § 10.6, at
611; HARTMAN, supra note 26, § 10.4, at 597; TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-15, at 441; HELLERSTEIN,
supra note 26, 1 4.13, at 155.
153. Quill Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1913.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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which a state may impose on interstate commerce.156 Therefore, the
justices concluded, a company may have sufficient minimum contacts
with a taxing state under due process analysis, yet still lack a "substan-
tial nexus" with that state as mandated by the Commerce Clause., 57
The justices argued that Bellas Hess was not descended from a
now-rejected line of cases that decided the constitutionality of taxes
according to rigid formalism. Therefore, Bellas Hess was not inconsis-
tent with Complete Auto or other later cases.'
In addition, the justices explained that the "bright-line rule" of
Bellas Hess-which exempted from use taxation those firms whose
contact with the forum state was limited to mail or common car-
rier-promoted certainty in the law and tended to limit undue burdens
on interstate commerce by marking out a "discrete realm" immune
from this kind of taxation. 59 The Court therefore rejected the urging
of Justice White to overrule Bellas Hess in its entirety. 160
Justice White concurred in overruling the due process portion of
Bellas Hess but believed the "physical presence" portion should have
been overruled as well.' 6 ' Justice White contended that the majority
was without foundation in its opinion that it-was possible for a tax to
have sufficient contacts for due process purposes, but have insufficient
contacts to satisfy the Commerce Clause.6 2 He asserted that the nexus
requirement in the Complete Auto test was grounded in due process
and not Commerce Clause concerns, citing opinions prior to Complete
Auto which described the nexus requirement as a due process
concern.
63
Justice White believed there was no relation between the physical
presence/nexus rule the majority salvaged from Bellas Hess and the
"Commerce Clause considerations that allegedly justify it."'' " Because
of technological advances that enable a large volume of business to be
transacted nationwide without physical presence, Justice White as-
serted that retaining any form of physical presence requirement as nec-
essary for taxation of mail-order firms did not recognize that mail-or-
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1913-14.
158. Id. at 1912.
159. Id. at 1914.
160. Id. at 1916.
161. Id. at 1916-17 (White, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 1919.
163. Id. at 1919-20.
164. Id. at 1920.
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der businesses receive benefits from the states where their customers
reside. 6 ' Those benefits include banks, the court system, and waste dis-
posal.1 66 Retaining the physical presence rule was out of touch with
economic reality and was illogical since it created "an interstate tax
shelter" for the mail-order business. 6
7
Justice Scalia's concurrence"6 8 asserted that the Court would be
ill-advised to follow Justice White's suggestion of overruling the physi-
cal presence portion of Bellas Hess because people have relied on this
test, adding, "we ought not visit economic hardship upon those who
took us at our word."' 6 9
Quill is significant primarily because it removes the due process
impediment to states' collections of use taxes on mail-order businesses.
Since Congress has plenary power over commerce, it may sanction
state use taxes if it so desires. Congress may not, however, authorize
due process violations. If Congress decides that use taxes would be per-
missible burdens on interstate commerce, then mail-order houses will
find no relief at the Supreme Court; the Court will not second-guess
Congress where Congress has a clear grant of power in a specific area.
The Court's declaration that there is a nexus requirement in the
Commerce Clause, greeted with such skepticism by Justice White, will
likely add to the "quagmire" in this area of the law. 70 Under the Com-
merce Clause analysis of Bellas Hess and Quill, a company that ac-
tively and regularly solicits business by mailing twenty-four tons of cat-
alogues and flyers into a state each year 71 and by taking out almost $1
million in sales revenues 72-but which has no physical presence in the
state--does not have a "substantial nexus" with the state sufficient to
meet the Complete Auto test and allow imposition of a tax under the
Commerce Clause. 7 1 If Justice White's prediction is correct, the
Court's retention of a nexus/physical presence requirement under the
Commerce Clause as necessary for imposition of use taxes will result in
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1920-21.
168. Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined with Justice Scalia. Id. at 1923 (Scalia, J.
concurring).
169. Id. at 1924.
170. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. -v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458
(1959).
171. 112 S. Ct. at 1909.
172. Id. at 1908.
173. Id. at 1912.
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years of litigation over exactly what "physical presence" means in this
context.174 Justice White believed that whether Quill had sufficient
presence in North Dakota under this standard was not clear in this
case. 175 The majority's failure to set out a "bright-line" rule made it "a
sure bet that the vagaries of 'physical presence' will be tested to their
fullest in our courts.11 7  While Quill holds that mailing twenty-four
tons of catalogs will not equal physical presence for Commerce Clause
purposes, it does not give further guidance on when physical presence
might arise. In earlier Commerce Clause cases, the existence of actual
offices or employees in the taxing state would meet the Commerce
Clause concern that a tax be fairly related to the benefits the taxing
company received from that state. The presence of an office or of em-
ployees will undoubtedly meet the "substantial nexus" requirement of
Quill, but it is uncertain where "physical presence" arises in the con-
tinuum of activity between having offices in a state and mailing twenty-
four tons of catalogs into a state.1 77 In Quill, the Court said substantial
nexus was not established by Quill's licensing of a computer software
program to North Dakota customers that enabled consumers to check
Quill's inventories and to place orders directly. 178
Under Due Process Clause analysis, the Court still will be search-
ing for "minimum contacts"-minimum contacts which now may be
found in mail-order houses' "continuous and widespread solicitation of
business within a State. 179
It is certain that physical presence-whether it is a single em-
ployee 80 or offices with no relation to the company's mail order busi-
ness 18-in the taxing state will always equal minimum contacts under
the Due Process Clause. Under Quill, "purposefully" directing activi-
174. Id. at 1921 (White, J., concurring).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. In Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989), the Court upheld an Illinois tax on inter-
state telecommunications. Id. at 259. "Telecommunications" was defined to include phone calls,
computer exchange services, paging services, or any transmission by "wire, cable, fiber-optics,
laser, microwave, radio, satellite or similar facilities." Id. at 256 n.5. The tax imposed was on
interstate calls that originated or terminated in Illinois or that were charged to an Illinois service
address, regardless of where the call was billed or paid. Id. at 256, 263. All parties to the litiga-
tion agreed that Illinois had a substantial nexus under the Commerce Clause to tax the interstate
calls, and the Court did not discuss the nexus issue in depth. Id. at 260.
178. 112 S. Ct. at 1907 n.l.
179. Id. at 1911.
180. Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington, 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
181. National Geographic Soc'y v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
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ties at residents of the taxing state at a magnitude comparable to those
of the Quill Corporation will be "more than sufficient" to meet the
minimum contacts requirements for due process purposes even if the
taxpayer has no physical presence in the state.182 The courts will have
to determine the point at which the magnitude of activity directed at
the taxing state becomes too small to support the duty to collect a use
tax under the Due Process Clause.
If these remaining questions did not ensure years of litigation, the
amount of money at stake does. The direct mail sales industry has
grown from $2.4 billion in sales in the Bellas Hess era to current sales
of $130.4 billion.183 The 1991 uncollected use tax loss from mail order
sales was estimated to be $3.08 billion, and the projected tax loss for
1992 was $3.27 billion.18 4 States searching for additional revenues will
undoubtedly be seeking to persuade Congress to permit them to impose
use taxes, while the mail-order businesses will attempt some persuasion
of their own.
Emily Sneddon*
182. 112 S. Ct. at 1911.
183. Respondents' Brief at *10, Quill v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992) (No. 91-
194) available in (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
184. Id.
* The author wishes to thank Professor L. Scott Stafford for his guidance.
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